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The European Union is set to spend more than 300 billion Euros between 2007 and
2013 on Structural Funds which aim to support the development of poorer regions.
However, their allocation is not only determined by need, argues Achim
Kemmerling, but also by the ability of countries and regions to lobby for and absorb
funding.
Between 2007 and 2013 the European Union (EU) is set to spend more than 300 billion
Euros on regional development through its structural funds. This is the second largest
budget item after the agriculture policy and roughly the size of the Greek Gross Domestic Product. The
sheer size of these funds and their increase over time has generated much academic interest in their
impact on regional growth and convergence between EU countries. The results of this funding are often
not very positive, and political scientists have sought to understand why the governance of the funds
frequently changes, what impact this makes on the implementation of projects and how to make the
funds more efficient and effective. Some authors argue that constant innovation in structural funds
policy shows that this is a very experimental and innovative field in new forms of governance.
Both economists and political scientists take the technical criteria which regulate funds policies for
granted. For example, for the budget period between 2000 and 2006, two of the major objectives were
Objective-1 for the development of poorer regions; and Objective-2 for regions with declining industrial
and rural sectors. The official criteria of Objective-1 stipulated that regions should have a per-capita
GDP below the 75% average of the EU. For Objective-2, the criteria were less specific, but it meant, by
and large, regions with an unemployment rate above the EU average (as well as a declining
manufacturing sector).
Do these official criteria explain the regional allocation of spending? First some caveats: it is obvious
that the EU had in place some exceptions to the rules, such as fading out transfers to so called
‘converging regions’. These are regions almost too wealthy to receive any more aid through the
Structural Funds. There are also problems of measurement and aggregation. This, for instance, is the
reason that we can only show country –level data for Ireland and Sweden. Despite these caveats, we
see that in both cases the official criteria capture only a part of the story.
In both Figures below, the vertical axis shows the amount of Euros per inhabitant each country or region
receives. In Figure 1 which shows Objective-1, we see that indeed structural fund transfers fall with
average levels of income But we also see that some regions received money although they were too
rich to ‘make the cut’, namely those to the right of the 75% dividing line (roughly some 13,000 Euros).
More importantly, some regions with similar levels were given very different levels of (planned)
structural fund spending. Low GDP per capita was a necessary but not sufficient condition for getting
more structural fund transfers.
Figure 1 – EU Structural fund transfers based on GDP per capita rates
These patterns are even stronger in the case of Objective 2, shown in Figure 2 which shows transfers
based on unemployment rates. While regions with higher rates of unemployment do get more structural
fund transfers, the relationship is very weak and there are huge differences between similar regions.
Why do these huge differences occur?
Figure 2 – EU Structural fund transfers based on unemployment
We have investigated the structural funding recipients at regional levels with a battery of economic and
political variables, experimenting with several econometric techniques. We found that GDP per capita
indeed plays a (relatively) strong role, but so do some political factors. For instance, we find that
federalist regions get more Objective-1 transfers than others. This might be due to several reasons; for
instance, better administrative capacities. But we think it is also because these regions are more
successful in lobbying both the national and, in particular, the EU level.
For Objective-2 we even find that unemployment either does not play a role, or its influence is actually
the reverse: regions with higher rates of unemployment receive less money, arguably because it would
be difficult for them to match or absorb structural fund money (as Vicky Pryce mentioned in her recent
interview on this blog). And again we find that political factors such as the ‘political power’ of regions
matter, especially the political weight of a region in national and regional elections.
The literature on the political economy of structural funds policy is still in an early stage and future
studies may challenge some of our findings. Yet, these findings are both intriguing and important. On
the one hand, they show that the EU uses structural funds policy for various purposes, and as the
national literature on regional policy suggests, there are important trade-offs between efficiency, equity
and political legitimacy. In this sense it is perhaps naive to expect that structural funds policy should
have an immediate and direct influence on regional growth. On the other hand, our findings
demonstrate some of the regional politics of this policy and provide evidence of the role of ‘pork-barrel’
politics and lobbying in regional redistribution.
Please read our comments policy before commenting.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics
and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
__________________________________
About the author
Achim Kemmerling – Central European University Budapest
Achim Kemmerling is an Associate Professor of Political Economy at the Department
of Public Policy at the Central European University Budapest. He has published on
issues of tax policy, social and labor market policies, and fiscal federalism and worked
as a consultant to the German Federal Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag), the German
Society for Technical Cooperation (former GTZ, now GIZ) and the European Investment
Bank (EIB).
Related posts:
1. Recent measures may have signalled the beginning of the end of the Eurozone crisis. But the
transformation of EU economic governance is still far from complete. (5.8)
2. With no political union in Europe, the Euro crisis may be a ‘never ending game’ for deep-rooted
economic reasons (10.5)
3. Recent political developments mean that Greece is no longer on the brink of economic collapse.
But the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF will be keeping a close watch for some
time to come. (5.5)
